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Fraud may simply be defined as “violation of trust.” At its core, it is a human act intended to
deceive another in such a way that the victim suffers a loss, and the perpetrator makes an
unlawful gain. Fraud is perhaps best defined as: “All multifarious means which human ingenuity
can devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another by
false suggestions or suppression of the truth. It includes all surprise, trick, cunning, or
dissembling, and any unfair way which another is cheated” (Black’s Law Dictionary). As compact
as Black’s definition is, “fraud” still encompasses a huge range of human activity. The word
itself is malleable. Standing alone, “fraud” is a noun, as in “A fraud was committed.” If we add
“de” in front of it to form “defraud,” it comes a verb, as in “Sam defrauded Bill.” If we add
“ulent” to the end of it, it becomes the adjective “fraudulent,” as in “Dan engaged in fraudulent
behavior.” A multi-headed hydra in its diverse manifestations, even the word “fraud” appears
capable of morphing itself as different parts of speech to suit the occasion.
Fraud is theft, but not by force. This is a critical point to understand about the nature of fraud.
There is no robbery at gunpoint, no direct threat of harm or injury to the victim, or even any
use of physical force. Rather, the victim, in most instances, willingly gives away money or
something of value because of the lies and misrepresentation and the inherent betrayal of trust
that characterizes fraud. Thus, fraud is a deception, and such deception is natural and could be
covert or overt. Many living creatures, from the viceroy butterfly, which looks like the bitter and
mildly poisonous monarch butterfly, to the king snake, which closely mirrors the very deadly
coral snake, to the cuckoo, which brazenly lays her egg in a crow’s nest and abdicates maternal
responsibility, deception is adaptive and thriving in nature. The first instance of fraud may well
have occurred when two cavemen engaged in barter—exchange of goods—with one giving up a
club in exchange for some berries. To the extent the gleam in the eyes of each caveman was
indicative in one instance of the slight crack in the club, and in the second instance, that the
less-than-fresh, two-day old berries were about to spoil, it pointed to a “mutually” fraudulent
transaction! Also consider that in Genesis, Chapter 27, of The Bible, there is a narrative of how
Jacob impersonates his elder brother, Esau, to trick his blind father into giving Jacob the
inheritance that is Esau’s birthright. This is a classic trust crime relating to fraudulent usurping
of a sibling’s property rights.
“White-collar crime” refers to a financially motivated nonviolent crime committed by business
and government professionals. Within criminology, it was originally described as "a crime

committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation"
(Sutherland). Typical white-collar crimes include (financial reporting) fraud, asset
misappropriation, false advertising, labor relations, bribery, conflicts of interest, Ponzi schemes,
insider trading, cybercrime, copyright infringement, money laundering, price-fixing and other
anti-trust violations, identity theft and forgery. A combination of two criteria is generally
deemed necessary to define crime, viz., legal description of an act as socially injurious, and legal
provision of a penalty for the act.
The general theory of crime postulates that criminal and noncriminal behavior result from the
pursuit of self-interest and that “human behavior is premised on individual calculations of
relative costs and benefits of action.” (Gottfredson & Hirschi). See also SAGE Encyclopedia
entry under Economics of Crime. However, the “general theory of crime” has been criticized as
perhaps not being so general after all, because it certainly would not encompass criminogenic
organizations, and that organizational offending perhaps does need a separate classification.
Consider also that we have at least one federal law in the U.S., the Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act of 1970. RICO provides for extended criminal penalties and a
civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization, particularly
gambling organizations, criminogenic enterprises, and criminal syndicates. The RICO Act focuses
specifically on racketeering, and it allows the leaders of a syndicate to be tried for the crimes
which they ordered others to do or assisted them in doing. See also SAGE Encyclopedia entry
under Corporate Crime; Criminal Organizations and Networks; Organized Crime Activities;
Organized Crime Typologies.
Psychologists and criminologists believe that fraud, like any other crime, can best be explained
by three factors: a supply of motivated offenders, the availability of suitable targets, and the
absence of capable guardians. Recently, the A-B-C taxonomy, or the “bad apple, bad bushel,
and bad crop” theory has been proposed as part of the emerging discipline of behavioral
forensics (Ramamoorti et al.) Behavioral forensics, a growing and potentially expansive field,
asserts that behind every fraud is the central, inexorable fact: there are one or more people
behind it. We cannot be content asking the “how” question focusing on the instruments of
fraud, rather we need to be asking the “why” question, or what were the human motivations
that caused otherwise good people to do bad things? What makes corporate executives turn to
the dark side? Going forward, we need to consider the human factor seriously in the study of
the phenomenon of fraud globally. In this connection please also see the SAGE encyclopedia
entry under Behavioral Theory of Crime; Psychology of Criminal Conduct; Social Bonds Theory
of Crime; Social Learning Theory of Crime.
The A.B.C. (apple, bushel, crop) theory posits moving from the individual to a colluding group to
an entire culture or environmental factor when considering fraud. A.B.C. theory anticipates the
need for a multilevel analysis of a phenomenon as complex as fraud. There is also a clear
expectation that different units of analysis corresponding to the level of fraud perpetration (i.e.,
apple, bushel, and crop) may be called for. Under the A.B.C. typology, an individual acting alone

would be characterized as a bad apple. When there are accomplices and thus collusion is
involved, it is a case of a bad bushel. When the organization’s leaders engage in corrupt
behavior, however, and the whole culture is toxic, we have a case of a bad crop. The bad crop
syndrome can even afflict an entire industry, as we have recently seen in the case of the LIBOR
(London Interbank Offered Rate) rigging scandal or several insider trading rings.
The major elements of “differential association theory” can be summarized as follows
(Sutherland and Cressey):






Criminal behavior is learned; it's not inherited, and the person who isn't already trained
in crime doesn't invent criminal behavior.
Criminal behavior is learned through interaction with other people through the
processes of verbal communication and example.
The principle learning of criminal behavior occurs with intimate personal groups.
The learning of crime includes learning the techniques of committing the crime and the
motives, drives, rationalizations and attitudes that accompany it.
A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions (or personal reactions)
favorable to the violation of the law.

See also SAGE Encyclopedia entry under Differential Association Theory; Sociological Theories
of Crime; Strain Theory of Crime.
The fraud problem has been described as a "violation of a position of financial trust" and for
embezzlement to occur, there must be: 1) a non-sharable problem, 2) an opportunity for trust
violation and 3) a set of rationalizations that define the behavior as appropriate in a given
situation. (Cressey) He wrote that none of these elements alone would be sufficient to result in
embezzlement; instead, all three elements must be present. Given Donald Cressey’s seminal
role in creating the fraud triangle, sometimes it is referred to as the Cressey fraud triangle, with
the three vertices of opportunity, pressure/incentive, and rationalization.
At least two types of white-collar criminals have been conjectured in the literature, the
“accidental” or “situational” fraudsters, and the “predators.” These have also been referred to
as the “benign” and the “malignant” bad apple respectively. Others have urged that additional
research be conducted about predators and accidental (situational) fraudsters to better define
these notions and to develop meaningful criminological profiles. Treating all white-collar
criminals as one undifferentiated, homogenous group appears suspect and perhaps
unwarranted. Examining theory from other disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry,
sociology, anthropology, and criminology, can aid in efforts to understand and prevent fraud. It
can greatly help with developing criminological profiles in the context of white collar crime. See
also SAGE encyclopedia entry under Criminal Profiling; Personality Pathology; Psychoanalytic
Theory of Crime; Criminal Risk Assessment.

Theory and research on the psychology of white-collar offenders has historically been
underdeveloped. A certain negative synergy develops when criminal thinking traits combine
with the psychological traits of narcissism and psychopathy to create risk factors for whitecollar offending. The concept of “the dark triad of human personalities,” viz., narcissists,
psychopaths, and Machiavellians (cf. Paulhus and Williams), has been utilized to challenge the
completeness/effectiveness of the Cressey “fraud triangle” in that fraudster personality lies
beyond its scope. Indeed, it appears rather important to consider the personalities of those
who are more likely to commit fraud, particularly if they seem to have little or no conscience,
lack empathy for others, and exhibit no contrition even when they are culpable as fraud
perpetrators. For dark triad personalities, only the lack of opportunity prevents them from
lying, making false representations, and emotionally manipulating people to commit fraud; in
other words, if the opportunity exists, these personality types are very likely to perpetrate
fraud. This line or argument echoes an earlier observation that for those with a non-existent or
underdeveloped conscience (superego, in Freudian terminology), “their acts of dishonesty do
not create feelings of guilt or remorse, they can be expected to commit fraud whenever there is
an opportunity to do so with little chance of being caught.” (Albrecht et al.) To the extent dark
triad personalities typically fall under the “anti-social personality disorder” classification in DSM
V of the American Psychiatric Association, it may be helpful to refer to numerous pertinent
SAGE Encyclopedia entries: Antisocial Personality Disorder in Incarcerated Offenders,
Treatment of; Corporate Psychopaths; Criminal Attitudes; Criminal Justice Correlates of
Psychopathy; Psychopathy; Historical Antecedents of Psychopathy; Neurobiological Models of
Psychopathy; Psychopathic Offenders: Current State of the Research; Psychopathy;
Psychopathy Versus Antisocial Personality Disorder; Psychopathy, Etiology of.
For almost 20 years now, a (global), non-scientific survey of Certified Fraud Examiners (CFEs)
has been conducted every two years about the incidence, types, costs, and other characteristics
of “occupational fraud and abuse.” Occupational fraud is defined as “the use of one’s
occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the
employing organization’s resources or assets.” Occupational frauds are those in which an
employee, manager, officer, or owner of an organization commits fraud to the detriment of
that organization. The three major types of occupational fraud depicted on “The Fraud Tree”
(see next page after text) are: Corruption, Asset Misappropriation, and Fraudulent Statements.
See also SAGE Encyclopedia entries under Employee Fraud; Occupational and Corporate
Crime; Occupational and Corporate Crime: Prevalence and Statistics; Occupational Crime,
Categories of.
Several findings regarding the characteristics of offenders, length of fraud, type of fraud,
source or root cause of fraud, how the fraud was detected, the demographics of perpetrators,
the size of businesses who were victimized, etc. are reported. The longitudinal consistency of
the survey findings over two decades is noteworthy because “it is impossible to know exactly
how much fraud goes undetected or unreported, and even calculations based solely on known
fraud cases are likely to be underestimated, as many victims downplay or miscalculate the

amount of damage” (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners). The latest Report to the
Nations came out in 2016, and estimates the worldwide cost of fraud to be around $3.7 trillion
annually with organizations losing 5% of their revenues to fraud annually. See also SAGE
Encyclopedia entry under Economics of Crime.
Interestingly, fraud is still predominantly detected through (anonymous) tips and complaints,
accounting for 39.1% of the cases reported in the 2016 ACFE study. Organizations of different
sizes tend to have different fraud risks. Corruption was more prevalent in larger organizations,
while check tampering, skimming, payroll, and cash larceny schemes were twice as common in
small organizations as in larger organizations.
Given the rising incidence of fraud globally, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) released the Fraud Risk Management Guide in September 2016.
The COSO Fraud Risk Management Guide uses the following definition: “Fraud is any intentional
act or omission designed to deceive others resulting in the victim suffering a loss and/or the
perpetrator achieving a gain.” Given the key emphasis on intent, it may be useful to refer to
the SAGE Encyclopedia entry under Mens Rea (“guilty mind”).
Principle #8 of the COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework of 2013 states, “The
organization considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks to the achievement of
objectives.” Consistent with this principle, the COSO Fraud Risk Management Guide lays out
five corresponding principles, viz., fraud risk governance, fraud risk assessment, fraud control
activity, fraud investigation and corrective action, and fraud risk management monitoring
activities. Collectively, these principles offer best practice guidance for organizations in fraud
risk assessment and management.
In the United States, sentences for white-collar crimes may include a combination of
imprisonment, fines, restitution, community service, disgorgement or compensation clawbacks,
probation, or other alternative punishment.
-- Sridhar Ramamoorti (PhD, quantitative psychology, Ohio State, 1995)
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